Published in: Вопросы философии. 2021. Т. № 4. С. 27–38.
The argument from the sense of freedom, unlike many other libertarian arguments, doesn’t question the compatibility of free will and determinism, but is aimed against the belief that determinism is true. The endorsement of determinism undermines the sense of freedom and thereby excludes the possibility of rational choice. And since its possibility is a necessary condition for free will, the belief that determinism is true excludes it as well, the argument concludes. In the first part of the article, I outline how the sense of freedom can be understood and what are the reasons to admit its existence. For it is possible that the sense of freedom is misleading, in the second part I consider why we should think that it doesn’t deceive us, and what are the reasons against skepticism about it. In the third part, I formulate the argument from the sense of freedom; I also examine standard compatibilist defence strategies against such kind of arguments and demonstrate their inefficiency against the argument from the sense of freedom. In conclusion, I argue that the argument from the sense of freedom, supplemented by the antiseptic thesis, reveals vulnerabilities of all but the most desperate compatibilist theories.